Economic Community of West African States: A Trajectory in Regional Integration

Friday Aworawo
University of Lagos

Abstract
Over the past thirty years of its existence, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted sub-regional integration in West Africa to promote economic cooperation and development among member states. In this light, she has expanded its vision and redefined its mandate as well as roles in addressing novel realities, especially in conflict resolution. However, there are still challenges yet to be surmounted. This article examines the fundamentals of the overall performance and challenges of regional integration in West Africa. It adopts both descriptive and analytical methods that are native to historical research enterprise. It argues that the feat achieved through ECOWAS/ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone adds credibility to the conception of regional integration as a dialectical unity of cooperation processes. The study concludes that collective self-reliance, intensification of inter-regional trade, and commitment to democracy are the best approaches to regional integration in West Africa.

Keywords: Conflict resolution, cooperation, integration, inter-regional trade

_____

Friday Aworawo, PhD.
Department of History and Strategic Studies
University of Lagos, Akọka-Yaba Lagos, Nigeria
Phone: +234 802 915 9213; Email: faworawo@unilag.edu.ng

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, regional integration has become a fundamental theme in discourses on intra and inter-economic relations. In fact, integration of diverse political components at various stages has been recognized to be an essential feature in the promotion of good diplomatic relations and economic development. As a result, numerous international organizations have been created around the world to promote regional integration and cooperation. Countries from Western Europe, Asia and Latin America were equally involved in the integration processes. Many African states were also influenced by the previous examples with the formation of the East African Community (EAC), Economic community of West African States, (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC), to mention but a few.

The aforementioned organizations were formed with the objective of promoting regional integration cum development. In 1980, when African leaders signed the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), emphasis was placed on economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency with integration arrangements. However, the crisis of economic development that plagued the vast majority of African countries in the period shortly after independence, as well as the desire for economic development, largely necessitated ECOWAS formation of the process of integration in West Africa sub-region.

ECOWAS' Attempt at Regional Integration

ECOWAS was established on 29 May 1975 to promote economic and political integration in West Africa. From the outset, the organization has not deviated from the objective of regional integration. ECOWAS is made of sixteen member countries of Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone with its headquarters located in Abuja (Nwachukwu 1991: 11-12). The following are some of the objectives of ECOWAS as enshrined in her 1975

treaty; the promotion of cooperation among member states, liberalization of inter–community trade, enhancement of free movement of persons throughout the sub-regions, facilitation of the rights of people to reside anywhere in West Africa, etc. Thus, it can be argued that the main objective of ECOWAS is promotion of integration in social and economic fields. In order to improve on what was set out in 1975, the ECOWAS treaty was revised in 1993 with targets on economic, political and conflict resolution objectives (Bassey 2012: 271-272).

The economic objectives aimed at creation of a common market and a single monetary zone while the political objectives include the provision of ECOWAS parliament and court of justice, among others. The treaty equally assigned the responsibility of preventing regional conflict. ECOWAS has since inception attempted to realize these objectives through integration between and among member states. Like most concepts in the humanities and social sciences, however, integration does not enjoy a unanimously acceptable definition as several scholars have defined the term based on their intellectual orientations. It is, therefore, very difficult to define. For the purpose of this paper, integration is defined as cooperation between and among political entities leading to the creation of a new center and the formation of a sense of identity and integrated community (Aworawo 2006: 25). It can also be described as turning hitherto distinct units into components of a coherent system. It could be understood to mean the incorporation of equals into a political or economic unity.

For a very long time, scholars have recognized the lack of enthusiasm and aversion of political units to submit part of their sovereignty to a supranational organization as the greatest obstacle to integration. Thus, ideas began to emerge on how to achieve integration in spite of the intensive politics in the international arena. Accordingly, many theories have been

propounded to illuminate our understanding of the phenomena of integration among countries.

This paper adopts functionalism and neo-functionalism theories which have relevance to integration in the ECOWAS. An attempt has been made to evaluate their application and relevance in West African processes of integration. In the view of Mitrany (a leading exponent of functionalism theory), shortly after the end of the Second World War, integration could be effected through a transnational organization (Mitrany 1943: 77). Hence, international activities could be organized around basic functional needs such as transportation, health, cultural, trade and production activities. Mitrany identifies high politics and the reluctance of states to surrender their sovereignty to a supranational body as the greatest obstacles to integration. He, therefore, contends that integration is more effective when it begins with social and economic issues. He also noted that the passing of time would necessarily lead to integration at higher levels and on more issue areas. Cooperation will even involve political issues with the passing of time. It follows that functionalism assumed that internationalization of politics and economics would ultimately shift loyalty and sovereignty from states to international organizations.

This assumption is fraught with certain difficulties. Indeed, the creation of a new international organization may not lead to the shift of loyalties from states. This was, for example, well-illustrated in the case of the defunct East African Community. The Community had a well-organized East African Airways, which served the three Member States, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In spite of this, however, Kenyan industrialists persistently argued for a separately-operated national airways on the ground that the sub-regional one was inefficient and did not adequately serve their growing requirements. Such cooperation

effort must be global, not regional according to the functionalist perspective.

The functionalist perspective was modified and developed to a higher point of refinement by other scholars, notably Haas (1957) and Schmitter (1970). The new perspective came to be called neo-functionalism. The central idea of Haas was that there exists a continuum between economic integration and political union. Both were said to be linked together by the "spill-over" effect through which the tasks and powers of the central institutions are increased, and integration gradually encroaches on politically-sensitive area. Subsequently, the political community would emerge and grow. Haas further argues that cooperation on social and economic issues leads to ever greater cooperation as the different political units involved in the integration process enjoy its benefits. The neo-functionalists argued that integration process should be regional. This determinism was essentially prompted by observation of the European experience. However, seeing this, as an automatic process, leaves little room for conscious effort on the part of the actors involved; hence a degeneration of the subjectivist aspect in the process of integration. In addition, issues which are non-controversial and solvable by technocrats in the European context are generally problematic and require the attention of political leaders of Africa for a solution. None the less, the theory highlights the importance of achieving integration through issues that are not political.

As noted earlier, ECOWAS was set up to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the field of industry, transport, telecommunication, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, finance, etc. In 1993, the ECOWAS Treaty was revised to enable it address new realities, notably the global craze for democratization, security, good governance, and human rights (Nwoke 2005:113-114). The

upsurge of incessant conflicts, illegal cross-border activities in West Africa, and the opportunities provided by the African Economic Community expectedly provoked collective response among West African countries with ECOWAS providing an appropriate platform.

Contextualising Trade Liberalization/Inter-regional Trade
The ECOWAS as an agent of regional integration arrangement has the aim to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff restrictions on intra-ECOWAS trade, establish a common external tariff and commercial policy against non-ECOWAS countries, abolish all obstacles to the movement of all factors of production, and harmonize domestic policies across its member-countries. In this regard, a comprehensive trade liberalization programme was designed. It was to become operational in 1979 but had to be postponed till 1990 when it was finally launched. The implementation of the programme was planned for three stages. The first stage is for an immediate and full liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts while the second stage seeks the liberalization of trade in industrial products, with the phasing reflecting the differences in the levels of development of three categories of ECOWAS member-states. The third stage focuses on the gradual establishment of a common external tariff.

The trade liberalization scheme of ECOWAS is by and large a progressive reduction culminating in the elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers against intra-ECOWAS trade. The annual tariff reduction rates varied among the three categories of countries: (i) the most advanced of the countries whose schedule was expected to be in 6 years; (ii) the middle group countries whose completion period was set at 8 years; and (iii) the third group whose schedule was expected to last for up to 10 years (Nwokoma 2009: 226).

According to the agreed implementation schedule, total elimination of all trade barriers was expected to occur by the end of 1999. But as at that time, only one country was able to operate in compliance with the agreed obligation. The Authority of ECOWAS in December 1999 approved a new proposal – the Nigeria-Ghana fast-track approach, which suggested the elimination of all trade barriers by 15 April 2000 and the establishment of a common external tariff by 1 January 2001. In spite of the motives by the ECOWAS to catch up with West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), not very much has been achieved and there are issues yet unresolved such as the relationship between ECOWAS and UEMOA and how ECOWAS plans to complete the convergence of its trade liberalization programmes with UEMOA, which is yet to be seen (Oche 2010: 186-188).

In practical terms, ECOWAS has not been able to increase the volume of interregional trade in West Africa. For example, intra-ECOWAS export and import trade was only 9.25 percent and 13.61 percent of total West Africa export and import trade in 2019 (Ndubisi, 2009: 235). In contrast, ECOWAS export and import trade with EU was 31.44 percent and 45.5 percent of total West Africa exports and import trade for the same period (Aworawo 2016: 26-27).This unimpressively low rate of intra-ECOWAS trade cannot provide the required wider market, which is needed for modern industrial growth. Also, the balanced structure of trade links with the metropolitan countries has implications for the development of local industry in West Africa to produce manufactured goods as a component of intra-ECOWAS trade.

As part of ECOWAS strategies for promoting industrial development in West Africa, member states are expected to cooperate with one another in the exchange of industrial plans, avoid unhealthy rivalry and waste of resources, and harmonize

their industrial policies to avoid disruption resulting from dissimilar policies. In West Africa, the need to harmonize policies is higher in the industrial sector than in any other sector. During the negotiation for ECOWAS, most of the states supported efforts geared towards a national development of industry in West Africa as the foundation for an eventual coordinated regional approach to industrial policies, which are the subjects of Chapter V (Articles 28 & 32) of the ECOWAS Treaty. Unlike the implementation of the provisions on trade, which in the Treaty is timed the provisions for the harmonization of industrial policies make no reference to any timetable for implementation (Bolarinwa, 2005: 120). The provisions, however, provide for a three-stage approach for the harmonization of industrial policies within the framework of the custom union model.

Apart from the provisions in Chapter V, other provisions of the Treaty address the issue of industrialization. There are Articles 27 and 39, for instance, that provide for free movement of 'factors' within the Community in a bogus fashion. For instance, there are no definite provisions on strategy for harmonizing the politics of indigenization of individual member states of the Community. Also, there is the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, which was established by Article 50. The Fund's main purpose is to reverse possible inequality in development resulting from the application of the provisions of the Treaty on the liberalization of trade within the Community, as well as on the harmonization of industrial policies. The Fund shall derive its resources from "receipts from bilateral and multilateral sources as well as other foreign sources". Chapter VII and IX of the Treaty also contain provisions that are of relevance to industrial developments. There are provisions on programmes for the common evolution of common policies and joint development of transport,

communication, energy, and other relevant infrastructures within the Community.

By 1983, ECOWAS had been able to put in place an Industrial Cooperation Policy with the objective "to adopt a sub-regional approach to economic development which would include market integration (liberalization and promotion of intra-Community trade) and physical integration (in the areas of production, infrastructure, transport, communication, natural resources and energy". The Industrial Cooperation Policy is drawn around the idea that a sub-regional approach to industrial development should give priority to industries that would contribute to the modernization and promotion of other sectors. The Policy is also aimed at establishing the industrial foundations of the Community by promoting intermediate goods and input production industries. This is expected to facilitate the specialization of states or groups of states within the sub-region.

Since the end of the 1980s, cooperation activities in the industrial sector had been essential on the Community's Industrial Development Programme adopted in 1986. Activities under the Programme include rehabilitation of industrial enterprises, coordination of production activities through the involvement of the private sectors in member states, regional cooperation in industrial training, and sponsorship of West African Industrial Forum. While these are accomplishments in some respects, the pursuit of the goal of industrialization within the framework of customs union in ECOWAS region has only encouraged the extension of national import substitution by individual member states to regional level. The industrial structure of West Africa and the types of dominant industrial activities further reveals the weakness of import-substitution strategy for regional approach to industrial development in West Africa.

Free Movement

Based on the provisions in Article 2(2d) ECOWAS' Treaty which states that

> the community shall, by stages ensure the abolition as between the Member States of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital

just as Article 27(i) confers the status of community citizenship on the citizens of member-states and enjoins member-states to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the Community (Lafenwa 2008: 350). ECOWAS in principle recognizes the need to maintain and encourage inter-regional migration as a way of rationalizing and optimizing resources used at the regional level toward the liberalization of trade and improved competition. The central assumption of this orientation can be summarized at random with the words of one of the founding fathers of ECOWAS, Yakubu Gowon, who noted thus:

> Even more than the promotion of trade, the mobility of labour and the other factors of production were central to ECOWAS and exemplified what the community was about. The free movement of persons within the region was both a repudiation of colonial frontiers in so far as they impeded the economic development of the new States, and an affirmation of the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance. The intention in creating ECOWAS is that free movement of labour, like trade liberalization, would proceed gradually.
>
> (Gowon 1984:36)

Thus, the first concern was to give security to those already living and working abroad in the interests of stabilizing production and increasing economic growth, while the relaxation of control was expected to also channel skills and labour to countries where they were in short supply and provide at least temporary relief for those states without adequate employment opportunities. In other words, international borders between and among states would be considered corridors rather than lines of exclusion if all are to benefit from integration arrangements in West Africa.

The question arising from the limitations of the Treaty provisions on free movement led to the signing of the Protocol on Free Movement, Residence and Establishment in member states on May 29, 1979, which came to force in 1980. ECOWAS Treaty provides for the free movement of persons, residence and establishment, yet in practice, this cannot be automatic, and, therefore, the phrases "by stages" and "by agreements with each other". The main idea in the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is that at the end of a transitional period of fifteen years, every "community citizen" has the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of any Member State. The transitional period is trilaterally Phase I – Right of Entry of Establishment (1980-85); Phase 2 – Right of Residence (1985-90); Phase 3 – Right of Establishment (1990-95). The transition from one phase to the next, according to Article 2 (4) of the Protocol, has to be "based upon the experience gained from the implementation of the first phase". The Community has adopted all the three phases of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. However, ratification proved to be a very difficult and protracted exercise. The implementation of the Protocol was evidently a serious problem. For instance, all ECOWAS citizens, excluding those defined by law as undesirable aliens, may enter without a visa and reside in any member-state for a maximum of ninety (90) days.

The only requirement for ECOWAS citizens is a valid travel document and international vaccination certificates. While the visa and entry permit requirement may have been abolished in all ECOWAS member-states, it is observed that nearly all the States still maintain numerous check-points, and ECOWAS citizens are subject to administrative harassment and extortion. For example, there are over 30 security checkpoints between Nigeria's and Ghana's international borders; with duplications of functions by security agents. Most of the checkpoints are artificially designed for extortion.

The ECOWAS Agenda for Action was put in place to ease the procedures at entry and exit points further and facilitate free movement. It involves the use of ECOWAS Travel Certificate to ease and simplify formalities for cross-border movement. In 1993, it was reported that the number of countries printing ECOWAS Travel Certificate increased substantially. The ECOWAS Travel Certificate has been in circulation in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS claims that "high printing costs are a prohibiting factor for some Member States", and financial assistance is being sought from a number of donors for such countries.

Part of ECOWAS migration rules is that ECOWAS citizens holding a Travel Certificate or Passport should be exempted from filling migration and emigration forms for ECOWAS Member States. The harmonized immigration and emigration forms were introduced, and to be used in only exceptional cases. But member-states have been reluctant to introduce these forms for use.

There is also the ECOWAS Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme that was introduced as an accompanying measure to the other programmes on free movements and goods. Twelve countries have currently applied for the scheme. These

are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In spite of the lofty provisions of ECOWAS Treaty and protocols, the continuous initiation and application of discriminating economic policies against non-citizens (including Community citizens) by the various ECOWAS countries, at best, has ridiculed the claims of the liberalization of movement of persons in ECOWAS sub-region. Today there are different levels of restriction against free movement in ECOWAS region. The first level consists of the restrictive measures by individual member-states of ECOWAS to protect national interests defined in most cases as the security, income, and safety of their nationals and their property. Such include immigration laws and indigenization policies and programmes.

The duplication and multiplication of regional integration schemes in the West African sub-region have always created the problem of multiple loyalties. The laws and rules of the smaller groupings such as UEMOA for example on the movement of persons within a larger one like ECOWAS have a tendency to create problems except the policies and programmes of the two bodies are harmonized. The second level of restrictions represents the policies and programmes of the smaller groupings, especially as they relate to population movement. The ECOWAS Treaty and Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons with its contradictions remain the third level of restrictions.

Conflict Management and Good Governance
Although the first Treaty of ECOWAS was silent on conflict management and prevention, it was however appreciated quiet early in the life of the Community that no meaningful economic integration and cooperation could take place within the sub-region without peace and security. The Protocol on Non-Aggression, 1978, and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance

on Defence, 1981, were nevertheless incorporated into the ECOWAS Treaty to address some security concerns. In August 1990, ECOWAS sent a peace enforcement force – the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – to Liberia following the outbreak of a civil war in the country (Adebajo, 2008: 177-178). At the time the ECOMOG force moved into Liberia, it was almost certain that neither the United Nations nor the United States was going to intervene to bring about peace. Indeed, ECOWAS rose creditably to the challenges of conflict management and peace keeping in West Africa at a time when the great powers had literally abandoned West Africa and indeed the continent as a whole and focused their attention on Bosnia in Europe.

As the international community delayed and appeared confused, Liberia's neighbours and other countries in West Africa were grappling with the inflow of refugees. This development, no doubt, affected the perception of ECOWAS members-state that identified the Liberian crisis as a threat to the peace and economic well-being of the sub-region. Subsequently, in August 1990, a Peace Plan was announced for Liberia. In the official circles of some West African countries, specifically the regional hegemony, Nigeria, intervention was seen in terms of the defense of peace and security in the sub-region as well as in the spirit of good-neighbourliness. Nevertheless, support for the initial operations of ECOMOG in Liberia was not total as some member states of ECOWAS only approved of ECOMOG operations quite reluctantly. Nevertheless, ECOWAS equally intervened in the Sierra Leonean Civil War as a security strategy to curtail threats to regional economic integration.

The intervention by ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia was an ad hoc sub-regional response to the challenges of peacekeeping and conflict management. It was, therefore, expected to be confronted with

challenges. Subsequent engagement of ECOWAS with conflict resolution and management in other parts of West Africa brought lessons, all of which eventually led to the adoption of an ECOWAS' Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security in December 1999. Together with the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, the Mechanism provides the foundation for ECOWAS' collective security system. ECOWAS has continued to work towards improving its collective security system. For example, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission met in Abidjan from 14-18 August 2002 and approved a harmonized training programme for ECOMOG stand-by units in three training schools in the region – the Peacekeeping School in Zambakro, Cote d'Ivoire, the Kofi Annan International Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, and the National War College in Abuja, Nigeria.

On 17 October 2002, West African troops were deployed in Cote d'Ivoire as ECOWAS assistance in that region. On 28 February 2004, the UN Security Council voted in favour of integrating these West African peacekeepers into a UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (Vogt, 1991:26). When crisis resurfaced in Liberia in 2003, ECOWAS deployed a second peacekeeping operation in the region. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached on 19th August 2003, after which the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) began deployment outside Monrovia. The UN later approved the conversion of ECOMIL into a UN International Stabilization Force.

The development of a sub-regional mechanism for conflict management and peacekeeping has progressed far more in West Africa than any other parts of Africa. The accomplishment of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone has earned the regional organization a measure of international recognition. Arguably, this can be linked to paying due regard to

the issues of good governance and democratization. Some of the principles espoused in the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States and other major declarations on the various conflicts in West Africa underline the notion that democratization, responsive and responsible governance are the most effective conflict management tools. Because there exists consensus among member-States of ECOWAS on the need to operate an effective sub-regional conflict management mechanism that also takes seriously the issues of good governance and democracy. The returns on investment on collective security have been quite high in West Africa.

Recently the sub-region was reportedly said to be experiencing an improvement in its security situation. This can be ascribed to a commitment to the principles of democracy and good governance as expressed in the democratic elections in Burkina Faso, Liberia, and successful political transition that occurred in Guinea Bissau and Togo. In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS supported the appointment of a Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to facilitate peace process and national reconstruction actions in the country. Also in Cote d'Ivoire, ECOWAS remains committed to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1633 and the mechanism put in place by the International Task Force. ECOWAS' recent intervention in the Gambia was responsible for the sustenance of democratic process in the country.

Despite some success stories, conflict management mechanism of ECOWAS is still largely underdeveloped and generally lacking in established institutions and structures. Because of the absence of institutionalized structures for conflict management, conflict resolution initiatives have mostly taken ad hoc forms. In the Liberian conflict, for example, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government established a Community Standing Mediation Committee, which in turn created the ECOMOG at its

inaugural session. In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government did not formally approve of the ECOMOG force until some three months after its inauguration. In Guinea Bissau, the ministerial-level ECOWAS Defense Council voted to extend ECOMOG's mandate to Guinea Bissau even before ECOWAS Heads of State and Government had time to address the issue.

The establishment of ECOWAS' Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in December 1999 is commendable as a commitment by ECOWAS to create permanent machinery for ensuring lasting peace and stability. However, the Mechanism does not address the critical issue of who would determine when and how the military force under the Mechanism would be deployed. ECOWAS, like many sub-regional organizations in Africa, lacks effective early warning systems, reconnaissance, logistical capacities, risk assessment capacities, and, therefore, is considerably weak in conflict prevention. Although, ECOWAS can now boast of an Observation and Monitoring Centre, which is the hub of ECOWAS Early Warning System, it is hoped that the proposed standby force, ECOBRIG, would be well-organized for the management of West African security in the face of rising threat of terrorism in West Africa (Adeleke, 2007: 445-446).

Conclusion

The process of West African integration through ECOWAS has writhed many deficits. The production structures of ECOWAS member countries are not complementary. In other words, the production structures in the member states are rather competitive and conflicting rather than complementing. This, in turn, reduces inter regional exchanges. The strategy of reducing customs duties to increase inter-regional trade in West Africa, though necessary, is not sufficient for promoting inter-regional trade in the sub-regions As such, ECOWAS is confronted with so many

challenges; yet, there are opportunities for improvement. Indeed, for real integration to take place in West Africa, member states have to intensify inter-regional trading activities in all ramifications because inter-sub-regional trade is still very low. It is also important for ECOWAS member states to intensify free movement of persons across borders by eliminating the various artificial road blocks put in place by security personnel at the borders. Furthermore, there is the need for collective self-reliance, commitment to democracy, as well as avoidance of armed conflict, which is a major impediment to regional integration in West Africa.

References

Adebajo, A. (2008) "Mad Dogs and Glory: Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone". Adekeye, A. and A. R. Mustapha (Eds.) *Gullivers Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War*. Scoosville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press.

Adeleke, A. (2007) "From Ecomog to Ecobrig: Regionalising the Security Architecture in West Africa". Potgieter, T. (Ed.) *Regions, Regional Organizations and Military Power*. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University Military Academy.

Bassey, C & M. Nyonge (2012) "Nigeria and ECOWAS in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects of Meaningful Sub-regional Integration". Thomas A. Imobighe and W. O. Alli (Eds.) *Perspective on Nigeria's National Politics and External Relations*. Ibadan: University Press Ltd.

Bolarinwa, J. (2005) "The ECOWAS' Integration and Development". *Nigerian Journal of Policy and Development* Vol. 4, 120.

Gowon, Y. (1984) The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration. PhD Thesis, University of Warwick.

Haas, E. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Philippe, S. (1970) "A Revised Theory of Integration". *International Organizations* 24, 4.

Lafenwa, S. A. (2008) "ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of and Border Security in the West African Sub-Region: The Nigerian Experience". *The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal* Vol. 4(3): 350.

Mitrany, D. (1943) *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Nwachukwu, I. (1991) *Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985: Towards A Dynamic Regional Integration*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.

Nwoke, C. N. (2005) "Nigeria and ECOWAS". Ogwu, U. J. (Ed.) *New Horizons for Nigeria in the World Affairs*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Nwokoma, I. N. (2009) "ECOWAS and Intra-Regional Trade, 1975-2008". Ogwu, J. and W. Alli (Eds.) *ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Oche, O. (2010) "Trade and Regional Integration in West Africa: The Nigerian Case in West Africa". Akinyeye, Y. (ed.) *Nation-States and the Challenges of Regional Integration in West Africa: The Case of Nigeria*. Paris: Editions Karthala, 186-187.

Vogt, M. (1991) "The Problems and Challenges of Peace-making: from Peacemaking to Peace-enforcement". Vogt, M. A. (Ed.) *Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Publication Co. Ltd.